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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH, GONZALES, AND
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S VISION OF AMERICAN
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
LAURA WOLK' & 0. CARTER SNEAD*
INTRODUCTION
A law is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' Twenty-five years have
elapsed since a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated this
undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 yet its contours remain elusive. Notably,
two current members of the Court-Justice Breyer and Justice
Kennedy-seem to fundamentally differ in their understanding
of what Casey requires and permits. In Gonzales v. Carhart,3 Jus-
tice Kennedy emphasized a wide range of permissible state in-
terests implicated by abortion4 and indicated that courts should
defer to States when they regulate in areas of medical uncer-
tainty.5 According to Justice Kennedy, "[w]here [the State] has
a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden,
the State may use its regulatory power" to impose regulations
"in furtherance of its legitimate interests. "6 More recently, Jus-
tice Breyer wrote in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt7 that
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2016.
** William P. and Hazel B. White Director, Notre Dame Center for Ethics and
Culture; Professor of Law and Concurrent Professor of Political Science, Universi-
ty of Notre Dame.
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
2. Id. at 877-79.
3. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
4. See id. at 163.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 158.
7. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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Casey requires courts to "consider the burdens a law imposes
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer"
on pregnant women.8 Justice Breyer also opined that courts
retain an active role in resolving questions of medical uncer-
tainty9 and took a narrow view of permissible State inter-
ests.10 This decision maps onto the approach he took in au-
thoring Stenberg v. Carhart," another of the Supreme Court's
seminal abortion decisions.
As a purely academic matter, these fundamentally conflict-
ing interpretations of Casey are notable because of Justice Ken-
nedy's co-authorship of that decision's joint opinion. Yet, the
Court's alternative approaches have wide-ranging practical
ramifications as well because they send radically different sig-
nals to state legislatures regarding the field of legitimate inter-
ests and the appropriate role of the courts in assessing legisla-
tion. Texas has recently brought this issue to the fore through
its efforts to prohibit a particular type of second-trimester abor-
tion procedure, which it calls a "live dismemberment abor-
tion."12 Under Gonzales, the Texas law should easily pass consti-
tutional muster: It invokes the same interests as those Gonzales
held to be legitimate, leaves alternative abortion methods un-
touched, and regulates in an area of medical uncertainty. Yet,
looking largely to Whole Woman's Health for guidance, the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Western District of Texas struck
down the law as facially unconstitutional.13
8. Id. at 2309.
9. See id. at 2310.
10. See id. at 2311, 2315-16.
11. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
12. See Act of May 26, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 441, § 6, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1167-68 (codified at TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 171.151-.154).
13. Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 952-53 (W.D. Tex.
2017). Professor Snead testified as one of Texas's expert witnesses in this litiga-
tion. Of course, the challenge to Texas's legislation is still in its early stages, and
there is never any guarantee that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Howev-
er, at least seven other states have enacted similar laws, including Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Kansas, and Oklahoma. See id. at 945-46 (listing and citing cases). It ac-
cordingly seems plausible that these issues will continue percolating in the district
courts and eventually warrant Supreme Court review. Rather than addressing




This Article uses Texas's latest legislative attempt to explore
the tension arising out of the Court's inconsistent treatment of
state interests and the role of the courts in assessing legislative
factfinding. Part I re-examines the principles laid out in the Su-
preme Court's four canonical abortion decisions since Roe v.
Wade.14 It emphasizes the difference between Justice Breyer's
and Justice Kennedy's approaches to applying Casey, culminat-
ing in Justice Kennedy's curious decision to join Justice Brey-
er's opinion (without comment) in Whole Woman's Health. Part
II then describes the aforementioned Texas statute, Texas Sen-
ate Bill 8, and the district court's assessment of its constitution-
ality. It explains how this case demonstrates the inherent con-
flict between Gonzales and Whole Woman's Health and argues
that the Texas law affords Justice Kennedy an apt vehicle to
decide which interpretation of Casey should prevail. Specifical-
ly, it contends that challenges to laws such as Texas Senate Bill
8 would present the Court-and in particular Justice Kenne-
dy-with the opportunity to reaffirm Gonzales and, in so doing,
clarify the meaning and scope of Whole Woman's Health.
I. REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW
This Part provides an overview of Roe v. Wade's four most
important progeny: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Stenberg v. Car-
hart, Gonzales v. Carhart, and Whole Woman's Health v. Heller-
stedt. Many are no doubt already familiar with the terrain that
these decisions cover. This summary focuses on the Court's
inconsistent pronouncements regarding what interests may
support a state's pre-viability abortion regulations, as well as
the courts' role in evaluating a law's effects. More specifically,
it identifies the differences in Justice Breyer's and Justice Ken-
nedy's approaches to answering these questions, and it con-
cludes by presenting the question of whether Gonzales and
Whole Woman's Health may coexist.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
No. 3] 721
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A. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In 1992, plaintiffs in Casey brought facial challenges to five
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.15 In as-
sessing the provisions' constitutionality, a plurality of the Court
replaced the "elaborate but rigid"16 trimester framework articu-
lated in Roe with the now-familiar undue burden standard.1 7
The decision's joint opinion-co-authored by Justices Ken-
nedy, Souter, and O'Connor-reaffirmed:
[T]he right of the woman to choose to have an abortion be-
fore viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State. Before viability, the State's interests are not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective
right to elect the procedure.18
Even so, it also explained that "the State has legitimate inter-
ests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of
the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child."19
Though the Roe Court had also recognized this "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life," 20 the Casey joint opinion observed that subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions had "undervalue[d]" this "substantial
interest,"21 giving it "too little acknowledgment and implemen-
tation."2 2 Accordingly, the undue burden standard, which pro-
hibits laws that have the "purpose or effect" of erecting "sub-
stantial obstacle[s] in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus,"23 seeks "[t]o protect the central right rec-
ognized by Roe v. Wade while at the same time accommodating
the State's profound interest in potential life." 24 Thus, as the
plurality explained, the standard permits "[r]egulations which
do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
15. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
16. Id. at 872 (plurality opinion).
17. See id. at 846 (majority opinion).
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
21. Id. at 875-76.
22. Id. at 871.
23. Id. at 877.
24. Id. at 878.
722 [Vol. 41
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State ... may express profound respect for the life of the un-
born ... if they are not a substantial obstacle" to a woman's
right to obtain an abortion.25
The Casey plurality also made it clear that the state may in-
voke other interests to support pre-viability regulations, in-
cluding to "further the health or safety of a woman seeking an
abortion."26 Though "[u]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obsta-
cle ... impose an undue burden,"2 7 the state may legitimately
regulate to protect a pregnant woman's physical and psycho-
logical health.28 Assessing one of the Act's informed consent
provisions, a plurality of the Court stated that providing
"truthful, nonmisleading information" -even information con-
cerning what happens to the fetus during an abortion proce-
dure-"furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk
that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later,
with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed."29 In addition to fetal life and maternal
health, the plurality also recognized the existence of "other val-
id state interest[s]" that may justify State regulations.3 0
But Casey's overall tone is in some ways even more im-
portant than the rules it lays out. Throughout, the plurality
opinion seemed to self-consciously adopt a diplomatic ap-
proach that aspired to strike a more accommodating balance
between the many societal views on abortion. The plurality
acknowledged that the Court's decision in Roe "call[ed] the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
25. See id.; see also id. at 883 ("[Wie permit a State to further its legitimate goal of
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a deci-
sion that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a
preference for childbirth over abortion.").
26. Id. at 878.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See id. at 882 ("It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a
facet of health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion
would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.");
see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (defining "health" for purposes of
the health exception to include "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age-relevant o the well-being of the patient").
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion).
30. See id. at 877.
No. 3] 723
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division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Consti-
tution," 1 but that abortion nevertheless remained as divisive as
it did in 1973.32 It also recognized that, in practice, Roe system-
atically devalued state interests, which in turn prevented states
"from expressing a preference for normal childbirth" through
the "democratic processes."33 Thus, the plurality stated that,
unlike Roe's overly rigid framework, the undue burden stand-
ard provided "the appropriate means of reconciling the State's
interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."34
B. Stenberg v. Carhart
Eight years later, the Supreme Court had occasion to test Ca-
sey's attempt at conciliation in Stenberg v. Carhart.35 There, an
abortion provider challenged a Nebraska statute that criminal-
ized performing "partial-birth" abortions. Writing for a five-
Justice majority that included Justices O'Connor and Souter, Jus-
tice Breyer struck down the law as facially unconstitutional.36
Before delving into its analysis, the Court described the pro-
cedures involved. As the Court explained, a partial-birth abor-
tion, clinically known as an intact dilation and evacuation (in-
tact D & E), refers to a second-trimester abortion that "begins
with induced dilation of the cervix. The procedure then in-
volves removing the fetus from the uterus through the cervix
'intact,' i.e., in one pass, rather than in several passes."37 The
mechanics of the procedure depend on the presentation of the
fetus. "If the fetus presents head first (a vertex presentation),
the doctor collapses the skull; and the doctor then extracts the
entire fetus through the cervix."3 But "[i]f the fetus presents
feet first (a breech presentation), the doctor pulls the fetal body
through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus
through the cervix." 39
31. Id. at 867.
32. See id. at 869.
33. Id. at 872 (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)).
34. Id. at 876.
35. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
36. See id. at 922.





The intact D & E differs from its more standard counterpart,
which also requires dilation of the cervix, because intact D & E
involves the insertion of instruments through the cervix into
the uterus.40 After about fifteen weeks, due to increased fetal
head size and bone rigidity, "dismemberment or other destruc-
tive procedures are more likely to be required" in a standard
D & E.41 If so required, the abortion provider maneuvers for-
ceps into the uterus, grips a part of the fetus, pulls it back
through the cervix and vagina, and "continu[es] to pull even
after meeting resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the
fetus to tear apart.. . . A doctor may make 10 to 15 passes with
the forceps to evacuate the fetus in its entirety."42
Abortion providers use intact D & Es to perform both pre-
and post-viability abortions.43 As a result, Nebraska needed to
demonstrate that it did not run afoul of the pre-viability undue
burden standard, which provides States with considerably less
room to regulate compared to the post-viability timeframe.4
Nebraska argued that the Act advanced its interests in "con-
cern for the life of the unborn and 'for the partially-born,"'
"preserving the integrity of the medical profession," and
"erecting a barrier to infanticide."4 5 Justice Breyer's majority
opinion struck down the statute for two reasons. First, the act
lacked a "health exception," which the Court read Casey and
Roe to require.46 Additionally, the statute imposed an undue
burden by prohibiting both standard and intact D & Es.47
Regarding the need for a health exception, the Court quoted
Casey and Roe's statement that, "subsequent to viability, the
State . .. may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
40. See id. at 924-25.
41. See id. at 925. (citation omitted).
42. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135-36 (2007).
43. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927-28.
44. See id. at 921, 930 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 870, 877 (1992)).
45. Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
46. See id. at 930 (majority opinion).
47. See id.
No. 3] 725
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ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."4
If the health exception attached post-viability, the Court ob-
served that it must also apply pre-viability, where a state's in-
terests are "considerably weaker."49 Thus, no recitation of state
interests could obviate the need for the inclusion of a health
exception.50 Moreover, Justice Breyer's majority opined that the
law did "not directly further an interest 'in the potentiality of
human life' by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as
it regulates only a method of performing abortion."5 1
The Court also addressed Nebraska's assertion that a health
exception was not required because banning intact D & Es
posed no risk to women.5 2 In assessing this argument, the
Court recognized the "division of medical opinion" regarding
the safety of intact D & Es.5 3 However, Justice Breyer's majority
opinion credited the district court's findings that intact D & E is
sometimes the safest option for women, a conclusion the Court
determined was supported by "significant medical authori-
ty." 5 4 Nebraska and certain supporting amici proffered contra-
ry evidence, but rather than deferring, the Court considered
their arguments "insufficient" to overcome the need for a
health exception.55 Instead, the majority concluded that the dis-
trict court's finding and the support in the record tipped the
scales in favor of requiring a health exception, especially when
combined with a division of medical opinion.56 As Justice Brey-
er explained, division among medical professionals "at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not
its absence."5 7 Justice Breyer emphasized that "unanimity of
medical opinion" is not required.58 However, he went on to ob-
serve that, "[w]here a significant body of medical opinion be-
48. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 930-31.
51. Id. at 930. (emphasis omitted).
52. See id. at 931.
53. See id. at 937.
54. Id. at 932.
55. See id. at 934.
56. See id. at 936-37.




lieves a procedure may bring with it greater safety for some
patients and explains the medical reasons supporting that
view, we cannot say that the presence of a different view by
itself proves the contrary."5 9 It bears noting that neither the
American Medical Association nor the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists were able to identify even one
actual case in which the challenged procedure was necessary to
preserve the health of a pregnant woman.60
The Court next turned to answering the undue burden ques-
tion. It first stated that "Nebraska [did] not deny that the stat-
ute imposes an 'undue burden' if it applies to the more com-
monly used D & E procedure."61 After establishing this
concession, the Court analyzed the statute's text, which defined
a partial-birth abortion as "an abortion procedure in which the
person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a
living unborn child before killing the unborn child and com-
pleting the delivery." 62 Because standard D & Es also often in-
volve movement of some part of the fetus into the cervix,6 3 the
Court determined that he statute's failure to include specific
anatomical landmarks meant that its text covered the broader
category of D & E procedures, and it struck down the statute.64
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy's dissent took issue with both
the majority's treatment of state interests and its failure to defer
to the state's regulatory solution in an area of medical uncer-
tainty. Justice Breyer's majority included the two other Justices
who co-authored Casey's joint opinion. And yet, Justice Kenne-
dy described the decision as a "misinterpretation of Casey" be-
cause it "close[d] its eyes to [the State's] profound concerns" even
though the state "protected the woman's autonomous right of
choice as reaffirmed in Casey."6 5 Accordingly, he dissented
"[flrom the decision, the reasoning, and the judgment."6 6
59. Id.
60. See id. at 965-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 938 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 978 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 922 (majority opinion) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(9)).
63. See id. at 939.
64. See id. at 938-40, 945-46.
65. Id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
No. 3]1 727
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Justice Kennedy began his blistering dissent by criticizing the
majority's "failure to accord any weight to Nebraska's inter-
est[s]."6 7 In Justice Kennedy's view, "[w]hen the [Casey] Court
reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe, a central premise was
that the States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating
on the subject of abortion, as limited by the woman's right."6"
This includes a state's ability to "take sides in the abortion de-
bate and come down on the side of life." 69 Thus, he took pains
to remind the majority that "[t]he political processes of the
State are not to be foreclosed from enacting laws to promote
the life of the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life
and its potential."7 0 He reiterated this point by noting that "Casey
is premised on the States having an important constitutional
role in defining their interests in the abortion debate,"7 1 and that
decision accordingly deemed it "inappropriate" to "provide an
exhaustive list of state interests implicated by abortion."72
Against this backdrop, Justice Kennedy proceeded to argue
that Nebraska's "critical" interests were legitimate under a
proper reading of Casey.73 He described the standard and the
intact D & E procedures in great detail, noted that a fetus can
remain alive for some time during a standard D & E as the
abortionist removes its limbs, and explained that witnesses of
intact D & Es have reported seeing the fetus's body move out-
side the woman's body.74 Citing Casey's statement that "abor-
tion is 'fraught with consequences for ... the persons who per-
form and assist in the procedure [and for] society which must
confront the knowledge that these procedures exist,"75 Justice
Kennedy asserted that states "have an interest in forbidding
medical procedures which, in the State's reasonable determina-
tion, might cause the medical profession or society as a whole
67. Id. at 957.
68. Id. at 956-57 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 961.
70. Id. at 957 (emphasis added) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992)).
71. Id. at 961 (emphasis added).
72. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
73. See id. at 957.
74. See id. at 958-59.
75. Id. at 962 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
728 [Vol. 41
Irreconcilable Differences?
to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in
the human fetus."7 6 This legitimate interest also permits them
to protect the integrity of the medical profession through
"measures to ensure . . . its members are viewed as healers,
sustained by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and cognizant
of the dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot
survive without the assistance of others."7 7
Notably, Justice Kennedy acknowledged outright that Ne-
braska's decision to proscribe intact D & Es while permitting
standard D & Es based on concern for the "humane" treatment
of the fetus involved moral judgments. Yet, he contended that
this was a decision that the State was "entitled" to make,78 and
he stressed that the Court was "without authority to second-
guess" Nebraska's conclusion that intact D & E blurs the line
between abortion and infanticide in a manner that puts the
medical profession and all of society at risk.79 He went so far as
to say that "[tlhe Court's refusal to recognize [Nebraska's mor-
al choice] [was] a dispiriting disclosure of the illogic and illegit-
imacy of the Court's approach to the entire case."0
Justice Kennedy next turned to the majority's approach to
the health exception question, which he argued evinced "a fur-
ther and basic misunderstanding of Casey."81 According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, the majority's approach "award[ed] each physi-
cian a veto power over the State's judgment that the
procedures should not be performed."8 2 He reasoned that
"[c]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate the relative worth of par-
ticular surgical procedures[,] [whereas] [t]he legislatures of the
several States have superior factfinding capabilities in this re-
gard."83 Thus, rather than taking on the role of "the Nation's ex
officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove
medical and operative practices and standards throughout the
76. Id. at 961.
77. Id. at 962 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730-34 (1997)).
78. See id. at 962-63.
79. See id. at 963.
80. Id. at 962.
81. Id. at 964.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 968.
No. 3] 729
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United States,"84 Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should
remember that "the State may regulate based on matters be-
yond 'what various medical organizations have to say about
the physical safety of a particular procedure.'"8 5 Accordingly,
especially where confronted with areas of disagreement within
the medical field, the Court should defer to legislatures rather
than to physicians.86
In sum, Justice Kennedy's Stenberg dissent offered a threefold
critique of Justice Breyer's interpretation of Casey. First, he crit-
icized the majority for giving the state's interest too little
weight. In particular, he described the majority as "view[ing]
the procedures from the perspective of the abortionist, rather
than from the perspective of a society shocked when confront-
ed with a new method of ending human life." 8 7 Second, he took
issue with the majority's unduly narrow view of permissible
state interests because the opinion seemed to insinuate that
states may only justify abortion regulations if they protect a
pregnant woman's health or the life of the fetus within her.88
Third, he stated that courts should defer to legislative factfind-
ing rather than to physicians, especially in areas of medical un-
certainty. All three critiques accused the Court of turning back
the clock to a pre-Casey regime, where state regulations needed
to survive strict scrutiny and where courts employed a "physi-
cian-first view." 89 All told, his stinging rebuke indicates that
Justice Kennedy understood the plurality opinion in Casey as
an effort to craft a balanced and statesmanlike solution to the
perennially vexed issue of abortion, which the majority-
including the two other co-authors of Casey's joint opinion-
had disregarded.90
84. Id. (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 456 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
85. Id. at 967 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted)).
86. See id. at 968-70.
87. Id. at 957.
88. See id. at 960.
89. See id. at 960, 969, 976.
90. Justice Kennedy also spoke out vehemently against Justice O'Connor's sepa-
rate concurrence, accusing her of "ignor[ing] the settled rule against deciding
unnecessary constitutional questions" and offering "the people of Nebraska
meaningless assurances." Id. at 972, 978. He also cited some of Justice O'Connor's
730 [Vol. 41
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C. Gonzales v. Carhart
In 2007, the Supreme Court once again took up the issue of
partial-birth abortion, this time with Justice Kennedy at the
helm.91 In Gonzales v. Carhart,92 the Court assessed the validity
of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003.93 The Act
banned the same procedure at issue in Stenberg, and it only pro-
vided for an exception "to save the life of a mother whose life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself." 9 4 Congress argued that
the Partial-Birth Abortion Act prevented the coarsening of soci-
ety and protected the integrity of the medical profession.9 5
The Court held that the Act withstood the facial attack
brought by four abortion providers.96 In doing so, many of the
points first presented in Justice Kennedy's Stenberg dissent
made their way into his Gonzales majority. First, Justice Kenne-
dy's opinion implicitly adopted the idea that it is permissible to
assess an abortion method from the point of view of society
writ large, rather than from the perspective of an abortion pro-
vider. The majority's elaborate description of the procedure
previous dissents as support for the proposition that courts should defer to the
legislatures in areas of medical uncertainty. See id. at 967-68.
91. By this point, Justice Alito had replaced Justice O'Connor.
92. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
93. See id. at 132.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
95. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156-57.
96. See id. at 133. This ruling rested on differences between the Nebraska law
and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, which, unlike the Nebraska law, defined the
prohibited conduct more narrowly to include:
[D]eliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus until,
in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the
partially delivered living fetus.
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A). These linguistic differences led the Court to conclude
that the Act was not void for vagueness, see Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147-50, and that
it did not create an undue burden by prohibiting all D & Es, id. at 150-54. Howev-
er, in noting that the law applied pre-viability as well as post-viability, Justice
Kennedy made a striking passing comment that "by common understanding and
scientific terminology, the fetus is a living organism while within the womb,
whether or not it is viable outside the womb." Id. at 147.
No. 3] 731
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supports this conclusion. Whereas Justice Breyer succinctly de-
scribed an intact D & E as requiring the abortion provider to
"collapse the [fetal] skull," 97 Justice Kennedy provided the fol-
lowing extended narrative:
In the usual intact D & E the fetus' head lodges in the cervix,
and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass .... At this
point, the right-handed surgeon slides the fingers of the left
[hand] along the back of the fetus and 'hooks' the shoulders
of the fetus with the index and ring fingers (palm down).
While maintaining this tension, lifting the cervix and apply-
ing traction to the shoulders with the fingers of the left hand,
the surgeon takes a pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum scis-
sors in the right hand. He carefully advances the tip, curved
down, along the spine and under his middle finger until he
feels it contact the base of the skull under the tip of his mid-
dle finger. [T]he surgeon then forces the scissors into the
base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely
entered the skull, he spreads the scissors to enlarge the
opening. The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a
suction catheter into this hole and evacuates the skull con-
tents. With the catheter still in place, he applies traction to
the fetus, removing it completely from the patient.9 8
More importantly, as in his Stenberg dissent, Justice Kenne-
dy's majority cited Casey to explicitly recognize the legitimacy
of state interests in protecting society from becoming coarsened
to "all vulnerable and innocent human life" and in protecting
the integrity of the medical profession.99 These interests re-
mained permissible, even though they relied upon "ethical and
moral concerns."100 Additionally, in contrast to Justice Breyer's
statement in Stenberg, Justice Kennedy's majority held that the
Act "further[ed] the legitimate interest of the Government in
protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child."'0' This
remained true, even though the Act still permitted alternative
97. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 927 (2000).
98. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 138 (internal quotation marks, citations, and paragraph
indications removed) (first ellipsis added); see also id. at 138-39 (providing addi-
tional, equally vivid descriptions).
99. See id. at 157-58.
100. Id. at 158.
101. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
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ways to cause the death of the fetus through abortion.102 Lastly,
Justice Kennedy went beyond his Stenberg dissent by explicitly
contending that the state could assert an interest in the preg-
nant woman's psychological health to justify the prohibition of
partial-birth abortions. As he explained, many physicians do
not describe intact D & Es to their patients in great detail; this
failure can later negatively impact a woman's psychological
health once she realizes the mechanics of the procedure.103 All
three interests indicated that the law did not have the imper-
missible purpose of erecting a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion.
Justice Kennedy also employed his Stenberg approach, as op-
posed to Justice Breyer's, to assess the law's effects.10 4 As stated
above, the act did not include a broad health exception. Like
the Stenberg majority, Gonzales read Casey's "preservation of the
mother's health" language'05 to prohibit laws that "subject[]
[women] to significant health risks."'06 And so, for Justice Ken-
nedy, the question became whether women would experience
adverse health risks as a result of the prohibition.0 7 Departing
from Stenberg, Justice Kennedy's Gonzales majority noted that
this "ha[d] been a contested factual question," with medical
professionals supporting each side's position. 8 Faced with this
disagreement, Justice Kennedy observed that "[t]he Court has
given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass leg-
islation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertain-
102. See id. at 164-65.
103. See id. at 159-60 ("It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her
choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more pro-
found when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she
allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.").
104. Like the respondent in Stenberg, the Attorney General conceded that the
Act would impose an undue burden if it covered standard D & Es. Id. at 147.
105. Id. at 161 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
879 (1992)).
106. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006)); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
931 (2000).
107. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161.
108. See id. at 162-63.
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ty."109 Again mirroring his thoughts in his Stenberg dissent, he
noted that Casey is inconsistent with the view that a law must
"give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their
medical practice" or "elevate their status above other physicians
in the medical community."110 Accordingly, medical uncertainty
provided "a sufficient basis" to stave off the facial attack,"' espe-
cially given that alternative abortion procedures existed.112
In emphasizing the proper deference owed to the legislature,
however, Justice Kennedy's majority pointed out that the Court
must not give such findings "dispositive weight," especially
where, as here, some of Congress's findings were incorrect."3
Even so, it would be equally inappropriate for courts "to leave
no margin of error for legislatures to act in the face of medical
uncertainty.""4 Instead of this "zero tolerance policy," courts
must keep in mind that "[c]onsiderations of marginal safety,
including the balance of risks, are within the legislative compe-
tence when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legiti-
mate ends.""5 Thus, "[w]here [the State] has a rational basis to
act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may
use its regulatory power" to pass laws "in furtherance of its
legitimate interests.""6
Justice Breyer did not write separately, but he joined a dis-
sent authored by Justice Ginsburg that (correctly) described
Justice Kennedy's majority as an "undisguised conflict with
Stenberg.""17 The dissent looked to Stenberg to assess the state's
interests and the law's effects.
Regarding the law's purposes, the dissent reiterated that the
state cannot invoke an interest in fetal life when an act only
109. Id. at 163 (citing cases, including his Stenberg dissent, 505 U.S. at 969-72
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).
111. See id. at 164.
112. See id. at 167.
113. See id. at 165. Importantly, Justice Kennedy did not state outright that Con-
gress's findings were incorrect. Rather, he noted that "[w]hether or not accurate at
the time, some of the important findings have been superseded." Id. This phrasing
also reflects a more deferential approach to the legislature.
114. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 158.
117. See id. at 179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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eliminates a particular method of abortion,118 and it argued that
the purported worries over societal coarsening are no more
than "moral concerns" that Congress has used to "overrid[e]
fundamental rights."119 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg noted that
these same interests could be invoked to proscribe the standard
D & E procedure, which "could equally be characterized as
'brutal,' involving as it does 'tear[ing] [a fetus] apart' and
'ripp[ing] off' its limbs."120 Finally, Justice Ginsburg's dissent
dismissed the majority's invocation of psychological health as
reflecting "ancient notions about women's place in the family
and under the Constitution-ideas that have long since been
discredited," and asserted that any problems with physicians
withholding information should be solved by requiring that
they provide women with the tools necessary to make an in-
formed and autonomous choice.121
With respect to the law's effects, the dissent cited Stenberg to
argue that a health exception is required "as long as 'substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a par-
ticular abortion procedure could endanger women's health."1
22
It adopted Stenberg's view that courts retain an active role in re-
viewing legislative fact finding, even implying that they may
have greater institutional competence in this regard.123
D. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
Most recently, in 2016, Justice Breyer authored an opinion in
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt hat struck down two Texas
regulations governing abortion providers.124 Rather than repre-
senting another direct volley in the war over interests and ef-
fects, the Whole Woman's Health opinion took an entirely differ-
ent tack.125 Overall, the decision marks a shift by Justice
Kennedy-who joined the opinion in full and did not write
118. See id. at 181.
119. See id. at 182 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 181-82 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
121. See id. at 183-85 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 174 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000)).
123. See id. at 177-79.
124. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
125. See id. at 2323-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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separately-and a departure from the stance he took in Sten-
berg and Gonzales.
Whole Woman's Health assessed the validity of two provi-
sions of a Texas law. The first required abortion providers to
have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of
where the abortion took place,126 and the second mandated
that abortion facilities employ the same minimum standards
as those applicable to ambulatory surgical centers.12 7 The stat-
ute contained no legislative findings, but the Court inferred
that the two provisions sought to protect the health of women
seeking abortions.128
In applying the undue burden standard, the Court discussed
a state's ability to further its interest in insuring "maximum
safety for the patient."1 29 When assessing such regulations, the
Court stated that "[t]he rule announced in Casey . .. requires
that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion ac-
cess together with the benefits those laws confer."130 This con-
sideration is required because, as Casey's plurality explained,
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or ef-
fect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion impose an undue burden on the right."131 In direct
contradiction of both Casey and Gonzales, Justice Breyer also
asserted that the Court "now use[s] 'viability' as the relevant
point at which a State may begin limiting women's access to
abortion for reasons unrelated to maternal health.""1 2
A six-Justice majority concluded that both provisions were
unnecessary and had impermissible effects."' For instance, alt-
126. See id. at 2300 (majority opinion).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 2310; see also id. at 2303 (noting the Fifth Circuit's holdings that
both requirements related to the State's interest in "rais[ing] the standard and
quality of care for women seeking abortions and... protect[ing] the health and
welfare of women seeking abortions" (alterations in original) (quoting Whole
Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 584 (per curiam), modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th
Cir. 2015))).
129. Id. at 2309 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)).
130. Id.
131. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
132. Id. at 2320 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 2300.
736 [Vol. 41
Irreconcilable Differences?
hough Texas argued that the admitting privileges requirement
would keep women safe if complications arose during an abor-
tion, the district court found that complications were quite rare
before the law's enactment.34 The majority credited the district
court's findings of fact and concluded that Texas failed to
demonstrate that "compared to [the] prior law ... the new law
advanced Texas' legitimate interest in protecting women's
health."3 5 Moreover, because the provision caused significant
clinic closures,16 it imposed a substantial obstacle to abortion
access, especially "when viewed in light of the virtual absence
of any health benefit" conferred by the law." 7
The Court analyzed the surgical center requirement similar-
ly. It again accepted the district court's factual findings that this
provision did not lower risks for patients or positively affect
their care in any meaningful way."8 Again looking to the reduc-
tion in clinics resulting from the requirement and the associated
effects on driving time, wait time, and overly taxed facilities,139
the Court credited the district court's finding that the law erect-
ed a substantial obstacle to a woman's access to abortion.
As the above discussion indicates, Justice Kennedy's decision
to join the benefits-and-burdens approach seems to mark a
striking retreat from the position he took in Stenberg and Gonza-
les. In contrast to Gonzales, Justice Breyer's majority opinion re-
asserted a more active role for the Court in reviewing legisla-
tive fact finding. Citing Casey, the majority argued that the
Court has often assessed abortion regulations by "plac[ing]
considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in
judicial proceedings."140 The majority sought to reconcile this
134. See id. at 2311.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 2301 (describing the district court's finding of fact that the number of
facilities providing abortions dropped by half leading up to and following enactment
of the admitting privileges requirement). Justice Alito argued in dissent that this
point had not been adequately demonstrated. See id. at 2341 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 2313.
138. See id. at 2315.
139. See id. at 2316 (noting that the parties stipulated that the requirement would
reduce the number of clinics to about seven or eight); id. at 2317-18 (describing
the effects on the remaining clinics).
140. Id. at 2310 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
888-94 (1992)).
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approach with Gonzales by pointing to that opinion's admoni-
tion not to give legislative findings "dispositive weight" nor to
accept them "uncritical[ly] ."141 The discussion, however, ne-
glected the broader context in which those pronouncements
were made. In particular, it did not grapple with Gonzales's
contradictory declaration that the "traditional rule," the rule
"consistent with Casey," instructs courts to defer to the discre-
tion of legislatures, lest their "legitimate abortion regulations"
be struck down "if some part of the medical community were
disinclined to follow the proscription."14 2
Additionally, as pointed out by Justice Thomas in dissent,
applying the benefits-and-burdens approach broadly has seri-
ous ramifications for States.143 The provisions in Whole Woman's
Health only implicated the state's interest in promoting mater-
nal health, but the majority did not cabin its benefits-and-
burdens test to that interest. It also declared that states may not
regulate for reasons unrelated to maternal health until after vi-
ability.144 This assertion directly conflicts with Justice Kenne-
dy's Stenberg view, which read Casey both to recognize a
broader range of permissible state interests and to explicitly
refrain from providing an exhaustive list of such interests.14 5 As
Justice Thomas observed, mirroring Justice Kennedy's concern
in his Stenberg dissent, the benefits-and-burdens approach
looks "far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that Casey re-
jected, under which only the most compelling rationales justi-
fied restrictions on abortion."1 4 6
141. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165, 166 (2007)).
142. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163, 166; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 971
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's cases had "establish[ed]
beyond doubt the right of the legislature to resolve matters upon which physi-
cians disagreed").
143. See Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 2320 (majority opinion).
145. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Casey, 505 U.S.
at 877); see also Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(contending that the majority failed to acknowledge a state's ability to "'use its
regulatory power' to impose regulations 'in furtherance of its legitimate interests
in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including
life of the unborn."' (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158)).
146. Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2326. See also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 976
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Casey disavows strict scrutiny review; and Nebraska
must be afforded leeway when attempting to regulate the medical profession.").
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II. TEXAS SENATE BILL 8:
TESTING THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF GONZALES
The preceding Part has demonstrated that the Court has been
far from consistent in its approach to assessing whether an
abortion regulation imposes an undue burden. Most of this in-
consistency centers on Justice Kennedy's and Justice Breyer's
seemingly conflicting interpretations of the principles set forth
in Casey, but it has been further compounded by Justice Ken-
nedy's silent acquiescence in Whole Woman's Health. May states
promulgate abortion regulations aimed at upholding the integ-
rity of the medical profession and preventing the coarsening of
society? May they regulate on behalf of life that "may become a
child," even if that life nevertheless ends by abortion? May
they expressly base these decisions on moral grounds? How
much latitude should courts extend to legislatures to regulate
in areas of medical uncertainty? The contradictory approaches
taken by the Stenberg and Gonzales majorities, exacerbated by
the novel framework set forth in Whole Woman's Health, leave
all of these questions unanswered. Meanwhile, state legisla-
tures are left in the lurch, knowing that their efforts may or
may not be upheld as constitutional depending on which opin-
ion a given court looks to for guidance. Similarly, courts are left
to decipher and attempt to reconcile the Supreme Court's con-
flicting messages as they decide constitutional challenges to
abortion regulations.
This Part describes Texas's recent effort to prohibit live dis-
memberment abortions and argues that this legislation pro-
vides an apt opportunity for Justice Kennedy to reaffirm his
Stenberg-Gonzales view of Casey as a pragmatic compromise be-
tween fundamentally opposed interests. Moreover, it enables
him to confirm the wide latitude enjoyed by States to restrict
particularly gruesome and controversial abortion procedures
when substantial medical authority supports the availability of
safe alternatives. At a minimum, evaluating Texas's law per-
mits the Court to provide some much-needed guidance to
States, abortion providers, and patients about the interests at
play and the standards that must be met for a law to survive
scrutiny under Casey.
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A. The Texas Law and District Court Proceedings
On May 26, 2017, Texas passed Senate Bill 8 (S.B. 8), which
prohibits and criminalizes "live dismemberment abortions."147
This term is not used in the clinical setting, but the act defines
it as an:
[A]bortion in which a person, with the purpose of causing
the death of an unborn child, dismembers the living unborn
child and extracts the unborn child one piece at a time from
the uterus through the use of clamps, grasping forceps,
tongs, scissors, or a similar instrument that, through the
convergence of two rigid levers, slices, crushes, or grasps, or
performs any combination of those actions on, a piece of the
unborn child's body to cut or rip the piece from the body.148
S.B. 8 shares three characteristics with the laws at issue in
Stenberg and Gonzales. First, because it regulates abortions in
the second trimester, it applies to pre-viability abortions.149
Second, the act does not contain a broad health exception. It
only permits dismemberment abortions "in a medical emer-
gency,"1 5 0 which is defined as "a life-threatening physical con-
dition aggravated by, caused by, or arising from a pregnancy
that, as certified by a physician, places the woman in danger of
death or a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major
bodily function."151 Third, S.B. 8 has a similar scope: rather than
proscribe abortion outright, it prohibits a specific method of
abortion. Namely, it prevents an abortion provider from per-
forming a standard D & E on a living fetus.152 S.B. 8 instead re-
quires induction of fetal demise prior to dismemberment, ei-
ther through an injection of digoxin or potassium chloride into
the fetus or through an umbilical-cord transection.153 The abor-
147. Id.
148. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 171.151, 171.153.
149. Subject to exceptions for maternal health and fetal anomalies, Texas pro-
scribes all abortions after twenty weeks. See id. §§ 171.044, 171.046.
150. Id. § 171.152.
151. Id. § 171.002.
152. See id. § 171.151 (noting that the Act also does not cover vacuum aspira-
tion abortions).
153. See Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 947 (W.D. Tex.
2017) (describing an umbilical-cord transection as a method whereby the abortion
provider passes an instrument hrough a woman's cervix and into her uterus, cuts
the fetus's umbilical cord, and waits for the cessation of fetal heart activity).
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tion provider can then remove the deceased fetus using stand-
ard D & E procedures.1 14
Though S.B. 8 contains no legislative findings, Texas also as-
serts many of the same interests as those discussed in Stenberg
and Gonzales: the Act "promotes respect for the dignity of the
life of the unborn," "protects the integrity of the medical pro-
fession," and prevents the further coarsening of society.55
Though not developed at length, the state also asserts that en-
suring fetal demise prevents deleterious psychological stress to
"both mothers and abortion providers."56
Regarding respect for the fetus's life, Texas explains that
most standard D & Es within the state take place between fif-
teen and twenty-two weeks gestation, as measured by a wom-
an's last menstrual period.'57 Texas notes that, at fifteen weeks
gestation, the fetus "looks like a fully formed baby, with arms,
legs, fingers, toes, and facial features," and it retains these
characteristics as it grows in size over the ensuing seven
weeks.58 Quoting Justice Kennedy's Stenberg dissent, Texas ob-
serves that during a standard D & E "[tihe fetus, in many cases,
dies just as a human adult or child would: It bleeds to death as
it is torn limb from limb."1 59 Texas accordingly views the
standard D & E as "brutal, gruesome and inhumane,"6 o espe-
cially because medical technology now makes it possible for
fetuses born at twenty-two weeks to survive.'6  Finally, Texas
mentions that some physicians believe fetuses can feel pain at
154. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order at 4, Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938 (No. A-17-CV-
690-LY) [hereinafter Defendants' Response to TRO]. As providers recognize, induc-
tion of fetal demise by similar means prior to a standard D & E delivery likewise
provides a method of compliance with the federal partial birth abortion law. See,
e.g., Colleen C. Denny et al., Induction of Fetal Demise Before Pregnancy Termination:
Practices of Family Planning Providers, 92 CONTRACEPTION 241, 243-44, tbl. 3 (2015).
155. See Defendants' Response to TRO, supra note 154, at 5.
156. Id. at 6.
157. See Defendants' Proposed Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 3, 13, Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938 (No. A-17-
CV-690-LY) [hereinafter Defendants' Proposed Findings].
158. See id. at 11-12.
159. Defendants' Response to TRO, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Stenberg v. Car-
hart, 530 U.S. 914, 958-59 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 5.
161. See Defendants' Proposed Findings, supra note 157, at 12.
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this gestational age, and ensuring fetal demise would alleviate
the ethical concerns associated with dismembering a live, sen-
tient human fetus.16 2
Though these justifications are most pertinent to the state's
interest in fetal life, they also implicate Texas's interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of the medical profession and society as a
whole. In support of these intertwining interests, Texas pro-
vides two graphic examples of events taking place during
D & E procedures. In one, the face of the fetus "look[ed] back at
the doctor" as dismemberment occurred.163 In another, "part of
a chest cavity [came] out with one lung attached and a still-
beating heart."164 Thus, because the state believes that the pro-
cedure affects all involved, it wishes to "require that a fully
formed and nearly viable unborn child be accorded a more
humane manner of death."165
Various abortion providers brought a facial challenge to the
relevant provisions of S.B. 8 in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas.166 At trial, Texas contended
that providers have utilized fetal demise procedures for many
years, and such practices are already commonplace in Texas.'67
It argued that multiple abortion providers use digoxin and po-
tassium chloride as means of safely inducing fetal demise, and
empirical studies confirm the drugs' safety and efficacy.'66 Tex-
as also asserted that a study similarly attested to the efficacy of
umbilical-cord transection.169 Aside from this research, Texas
maintained that certain physicians prefer inducing fetal demise
because it makes the ultimate D & E procedure easier, and some
pregnant women prefer that the fetus be killed prior to being
162. See id. at 13.
163. See Transcript of Bench Trial Volume 5 at 205, Whole Woman's Health v.
Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. A-17-CV-690-LY).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 206.
166. See Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 940, 952.
167. See Defendants' Proposed Findings, supra note 157, at 6.
168. See id. at 7-9.
169. See id. at 10.
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removed in pieces.170 Unsurprisingly, the abortion providers
presented contrary testimony and data.71
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had the better
argument and struck down the provision as facially unconsti-
tutional.172 After citing the principles announced in Casey and
expounded upon in Stenberg and Gonzales,73 the district court
discussed and applied Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt's
benefits-and-burdens framework to assess the act's validity.1 74
It did so even though the Texas law did not assert an interest in
the health of the pregnant woman, which was the sole interest
that justified the regulations at issue in that case.175
The court began by interpreting Stenberg and Gonzales in
light of Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. It read those cases
as holding that, "to the extent a law directly reached or might
be interpreted in such a way to reach the previability standard
D & E procedure performed before fetal demise, the law im-
posed an undue burden on a woman seeking a pre-fetal-
viability abortion."'7 6 Under this view of the cases, the district
court summarily concluded that "based on existing precedent
alone, the Act must fail."'7 7
Even though the district court considered its reading of Sten-
berg and Gonzales independently sufficient to dispose of the
case, it went on to assess the parties' competing contentions
regarding the safety of the methods used to cause fetal demise,
the availability of those procedures, and other debated ques-
tions.178 In doing so, it cited Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
for the proposition that it is consistent with Supreme Court
case law "[f]or a district court to give significant weight to evi-
170. See id. at 11.
171. See Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 948.
172. See id. at 954.
173. See id. at 943.
174. See id. at 943-44.
175. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
176. Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 945; see also id. at 954 ("This court concludes that Stenberg and Gonzales
lead inescapably to the conclusion that the State's legitimate interest in fetal life
does not allow the imposition of an additional medical procedure on the standard
D & E abortion-a procedure not driven by medical necessity.").
178. See id. at 947-52.
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dence in the judicial record" in circumstances where no legisla-
tive findings accompany a statute.1 7 9
The district court assumed, without deciding, that Texas's in-
terests in fetal life and the medical profession were legiti-
mate,180 but these interests played no role in its analysis. In-
stead, the opinion focused exclusively on the benefits and
burdens the law placed on the woman seeking an abortion.181
After assessing the competing evidence presented, the district
court found that all three proposed methods of inducing fetal
demised carried serious health risks and were not safe alterna-
tives to the standard D & E procedure.'82 The court also noted
additional burdens resulting from the prohibition, such as the
need for pregnant women to make additional visits to abortion
providers, the increased duration of the procedure, and the
imposition of additional training requirements on providers.'83
In sum, the district court concluded that it was "unaware of
any other medical context that requires a doctor-in contraven-
tion of the doctor's medical judgment and the best interest of
the patient-to conduct a medical procedure that delivers no
benefit to the woman."1 84 In so concluding, the court effectively
adopted the arguments and narrative of the plaintiffs without a
great deal of independent analysis or criticism. Accordingly,
citing Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, the court held that
"[t]he State's valid interest in promoting respect for the life of
the unborn, although legitimate, is not sufficient to justify such
a substantial obstacle to the constitutionally protected right of a
woman to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability." 85
179. See id. at 947 (quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at
2310); see also id. at 948-49.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 947-53.
182. See id. at 949-50 (digoxin); id. at 950-51 (potassium chloride); id. at 951-52
(umbilical-cord transection).
183. See id. at 949-51.
184. Id. at 953.
185. Id. (citing Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2299).
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B. The Tension Exposed by S.B. 8 and the
District Court's Reasoning
On the one hand, the district court's analysis amounts to
nothing more than a straightforward application of Whole
Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt o assess S.B. 8's constitutionality,
even though the law does not promulgate health-related regu-
lations. As a necessary result, the court made the pregnant
woman's health its preeminent if not exclusive focus, down-
played the importance of the State's interests, and did not defer
to Texas's fact finding.186 Consequently, the district court's
broad application makes the concerns raised by Justice Thom-
as's Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt dissent a reality: the
approach seems to displace if not nullify all state interests other
than regulating the medical procedure itself, even those that
the Supreme Court has previously declared to be legitimate.8 7
Thus, the decision demonstrates how an expansive reading of
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt conflicts with Gonzales's
reasoning. This litigation therefore serves as a perfect vehicle
for the Court to explore whether Gonzales remains good law
186. The district court's application is not without its own problems. As stated
above, the court also interpreted Gonzales and Stenberg to "lead inescapably to the
conclusion that the State's legitimate interest in fetal life does not allow the impo-
sition of an additional medical procedure on the standard D & E abortion" if it is
"not driven by medical necessity." Id. at 954. This interpretation of Gonzales and
Stenberg greatly misreads both decisions. The district court maintained that those
cases held that any imposition on the standard D & E procedure constituted an
undue burden, but in both cases, the defendant explicitly conceded this point. See
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) ("[T]he Attorney General does not
dispute that the Act would impose an undue burden if it covered standard
D & E."); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) ("Nebraska does not deny
that the statute imposes an 'undue burden' if it applies to the more commonly
used D & E procedure -,'well as to [intact D & E]. And we agree with the Eighth
Circuit that it does so apply."). Thus, the Supreme Court in both cases assumed,
but never held, that the laws would impose an undue burden if they covered
standard D & Es, and the district court erred by treating this question as explicitly
presented and decided.
187. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("One searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgment of
the premise central to Casey's rejection of strict scrutiny: that the government has a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life from concep-
tion, not just in regulating medical procedures. Meanwhile, the majority's undue-
burden balancing approach risks ruling out even minor, previously valid infringe-
ments on access to abortion." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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and whether Gonzales and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
may be peaceably reconciled.
Answering both of these questions requires Justice Kennedy
to take a stance on which interpretation of Casey should pre-
vail-the broad, pragmatic view he espoused in Stenberg and
Gonzales, or the narrower, more radical view he tacitly en-
dorsed in Whole Woman's Health. Most importantly, it invites
him to determine whether protecting the medical profession,
preventing the coarsening of society to the value of human life,
and expressing respect for fetal life remain legitimate state in-
terests. S.B. 8 implicates all three, just like in Gonzales.88 Fur-
thermore, as in Gonzales, Texas has demonstrated a rational re-
lationship between the regulation and the asserted interests
and has left alternative methods of procuring an abortion
available to pregnant women. Thus, should this case make its
way to the Court, Justice Kennedy would be forced to decide
whether these interests remain legitimate or if Whole Woman's
Health has effectively narrowed the field.
Should Justice Kennedy decide that these interests may no
longer serve as legitimate state ends, he would need to explain
this rather drastic departure from his previous conclusions.
Here, too, Texas provides an apt opportunity because its rea-
sons map almost perfectly onto Justice Kennedy's statements
justifying both bans on partial-birth abortions. For instance,
Justice Kennedy remarked in Stenberg that the intact D & E is
employed "only when the fetus is close to viable or, in fact, vi-
able; thus the state is regulating the process at the point where
its interest is nearing its peak.""' So too here, at least during
188. See Gonzales, 530 U.S. at 157-58. Importantly, Justice Kennedy relies on
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) to support the State's ability to
prohibit procedures that compromise the integrity of the medical profession.
Glucksberg's own continued viability has been called into question in the wake of
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the Supreme Court's landmark ruling
that recognized a same-sex couple's constitutional right to marriage. Those cri-
tiques, however, focus on whether Obergefell swept aside Glucksberg's mode of
constitutional interpretation, not its ultimate holding. See, e.g., Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
189. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the latter half of the second trimester, when the probability in-
creases that an unborn child could survive outside the womb.190
Furthermore, in Stenberg, Justice Kennedy found it permissi-
ble for a state to prohibit a method of abortion that resembles
infanticide, which thus poses a greater risk to the medical pro-
fession and society as a whole.191 Texas has made precisely the
same choice here. Whether because of advancements in scien-
tific knowledge, increasing cultural awareness regarding stages
of fetal development, or both, Texas has decided that it blurs
the line between abortion and infanticide to dismember a living
human fetus that has already assumed a recognizable human
form through methods that put the child at risk of "surviv[ing]
for a time while its limbs are being torn off." 1 92 Not only was a
state entitled, in Justice Kennedy's words, "to find the existence
of a consequential moral difference" between a standard D & E
and a procedure that first ensures fetal demise,19 3 but the dis-
190. Such survivals are at this point extremely rare, but still possible. See
Jacqueline Howard, Born before 22 Weeks, "Most Premature" Baby is now Thriving,
CNN (Nov. 11, 2017, 6:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/08/health/premature-
baby-21-weeks-survivor-profile/index.html [http://perma.cc/U4SY-JRN7] (discussing
the survival of a Texas child born at twenty-one weeks and four days who
weighed fifteen ounces). However, because legislatures enact broad, prospective
laws, there is no reason why they should not account for promising advancements
in medical technology aimed at keeping fetuses nearing the end of the second
trimester alive. See Rob Stein, Artificial Womb Shows Promise in Animal Study, NPR
(Apr. 25, 2017, 11:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/04/25/
525044286/scientists-create-artificial-womb-that-could-help-prematurely-born-
babies [https://perma.cc/RM96-BNVM].
191. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 959 (basing this description on of the testimony of an abortionist).
193. Id. at 962; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160 (noting that the medical profes-
sion "may find different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the sec-
ond trimester, thereby accommodating legislative demand"). Justice Kennedy's
explicit reference to a state's ability to consider moral considerations seems to be
at odds with decisions he has authored relating to same-sex couples. For instance,
after Stenberg, Justice Kennedy wrote in Lawrence v. Texas that, though many view
same-sex sexual activity as immoral, Casey required the Court to "define the liber-
ty of all." 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. Yet, his analysis in
Gonzales again relied in part on Congress's determination that an intact D & E
procedure "requires specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical
and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition." 550 U.S. at 158. It could be
that, in the ensuing years since Gonzales, Kennedy now concurs with Justice Gins-
burg's critique that a state cannot use moral considerations to prohibit a method
of abortion in a way that "overrid[es]" a woman's ability to access abortion. See id.
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tinction is also grounded in science. As Texas stated, the ad-
vancement of medical technology means that severely prema-
ture children are able to survive at earlier and earlier ages.1 94
Thus, just like an intact D & E, a standard D & E "perverts
the natural birth process,"9 5 of medically fragile, severely
disabled children.
Additionally, hearing this challenge would enable the Court
to provide a clear standard regarding the appropriate defer-
ence owed to legislatures when regulating in areas of medical
uncertainty. Justice Kennedy strongly condemned the majority
in Stenberg for failing to extend deference, reminding it that
"[c]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate the relative worth of par-
ticular surgical procedures,"19 6 and that "when a legislature
undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad."1 97
This remains so, even in situations where-as in the Nebraska
case-a law contains no legislative fact-finding.198 This attitude
toward deference persisted in Gonzales, where Justice Kennedy
noted that, although the Court retains an independent duty to
review factual findings in constitutional cases,199 it cannot
"serve as the country's ex officio medical board with powers to
approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and
at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Yet, since Casey, Kennedy has stressed that abor-
tion remains in part a philosophical inquiry and has emphasized the states' ability
to use the democratic processes as a means of expressing divergent views. See id.
at 160; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
This, combined with abortion's connection with human biology and medical science,
could allow moral judgments to remain a permissible ground for regulation in the
specific context of abortion. Either way, S.B. 8 provides an opportunity for Justice
Kennedy to provide guidance and clarity on this important jurisprudential issue.
194. See Howard, supra note 190.
195. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 968.
197. Id. at 970 (capitalization alteration removed) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997)).
198. See id. at 968-70; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164 (citing with approval Ma-
zurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a Montana
law authorizing only physicians to perform abortions even though the law had no
accompanying legislative findings and the respondents had argued that "all
health evidence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis for the law")).
199. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)).
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standards throughout the United States."20 0 Yet, Justice Kenne-
dy seemed to retreat from this stance by joining Justice Breyer's
opinion in Whole Woman's Health, including its interpretation
that a court's independent, in-depth evaluation of the evidence
is consistent with Casey.201
Here, the Court would again be confronted with a state law
endeavoring to regulate in an area of medical uncertainty, with
empirical evidence on both sides of the equation. Texas opted
to side with medical professionals who believe that fetal de-
mise is a safe and effective alternative to the standard D & E
procedure, but the district court concluded that Texas's deci-
sion was erroneous.202 This, too, provides Justice Kennedy'with
an opportunity either to reaffirm an interpretation of Casey that
seeks to accommodate both federalism concerns and the constitu-
tional right to an abortion, or to provide an explanation for why
this previous interpretation of Casey should no longer govern.
Finally, as an ancillary matter, Texas's case provides the
Court with an opportunity to answer yet another question left
open by its abortion jurisprudence: what role do the states play
in identifying and promoting new interests implicated by abor-
tion? As mentioned above, Texas initially asserted that its law
furthered the state's interest in protecting both pregnant wom-
en and providers from the psychological distress that the state
believes accompanies a standard D & E procedure.203 In sup-
port of this contention, Texas cited a study that found that clin-
ic staffers "reported serious emotional reactions that produced
physiological symptoms, sleep disturbances, effects on inter-
personal relationships, and moral anguish."204 The authors
provided similar self-reports and noted that "the feelings and
200. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518-
19 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
201. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (cit-
ing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-94 (1992)).
202. See Woman's Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 945 (W.D. Tex 2017).
203. See Defendants' Response to TRO, supra note 154, at 5-6.
204. See Warren M. Hern & Billie Corrigan, What About Us? Staff Reactions to
D & E, 15 ADVANCES IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD 3, 3 (1980).
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attitudes of those providing abortion services have a profound
effect on the quality of care the patients receive."205
Texas did not pursue this argument vociferously at trial.
Even so, the state's assertion of a novel interest implicates Jus-
tice Kennedy's acknowledgment hat Casey did not lay out an
"exhaustive" list of permissible state ends206 because states
"hav[e] an important constitutional role in defining their inter-
ests in the abortion debate."20 7 Thus, unless Justice Kennedy
now subscribes to the narrower view of permissible state inter-
ests intimated by Whole Woman's Health, the case presents the
opportunity to either reaffirm the states' panoply of implicated
interests or provide an explanation for the about-face. And, if
the Court opts to discard Gonzales's approach in favor of Whole
Woman's Health, it enables the Court to discuss to whom the
benefits of an abortion-related law may apply. Must such bene-
fits be exclusively experienced by pregnant women, or may the
state take cognizance of the burdens and benefits that such
laws present to others involved in the abortion procedure? An-
swering this question, too, would provide some much-needed
prospective guidance regarding the scope and meaning of
Whole Woman's Health.
III. CONCLUSION
Eighteen years ago, Justice Kennedy dissented from both the
reasoning and the judgment in Stenberg v. Carhart, calling both
a "misinterpretation" of Casey.208 To Justice Kennedy, the ma-
jority's decision to give the State interests "but slight
205. Id.; see also Colleen C. Denny, supra note 153, at 243-44 & tbl. 3 (noting that
some clinics opt to induce fetal demise out of concern for the psychological well-
being of providers and clinic operating room staff, including to reduce trauma);
Justin Diedrich & Eleanor Drey, Clinical Guidelines: Induction of Fetal Demise Before
Abortion, 81 CONTRACEPTION 462, 462, 464 (2010) (noting that "[i]nducing demise
before induction terminations at near viable gestational ages to avoid signs of life
at delivery is practiced widely" to avoid "the problem that faces the provider, the
team of caregivers and the patient" should signs of life occur).
206. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 979.
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weight,"2 09 its "substitut[ion of] its own judgment for the
judgment of Nebraska" in an area of medical uncertainty,210
and its application of heightened scrutiny21' all amounted to a
"basic misunderstanding of Casey."212 Yet, if his decision to join
the Whole Woman's Health majority provides any indication,
Justice Kennedy may be retreating from the stance he took in
Stenberg. And as Justice Thomas's dissent notes and the West-
ern District of Texas decision exemplifies, Whole Woman's
Health's benefits-and-burdens approach seems to establish the
"misinterpretation" of Casey as the proper framework for eval-
uating attempts to regulate abortion procedures.213 Thus, Whole
Woman's Health and Gonzales appear to be on a collision course,
leaving the proper interpretation of Casey an open question.
Fortunately, S.B. 8 serves as an apt vehicle for providing
some much-needed clarity on this issue. It squarely implicates
the same interests as Stenberg and Gonzales, relies upon very
similar reasoning, and requires the Court to take a stand on the
level of deference owed to state legislatures. Thus, it affords an
opportunity for the Court either to overrule Gonzales outright
or to provide further guidance regarding Whole Woman's
Health, particularly where states promulgate regulations for
reasons other than protecting the health of pregnant women
seeking abortions.
But perhaps most importantly, and aside from the practical,
on-the-ground impact of any decision the Court might make,
the challenge to S.B. 8 presents Justice Kennedy with the
chance to opine again about which interpretation constitutes
faithful adherence to Casey. Will Casey persist as an attempt at
compromise in a pluralistic, civil society? Does "[t]he State's
constitutional authority" still remain "a vital means for citizens
to address these grave and serious issues, as they must if we
are to progress in knowledge and understanding and in the
209. Id. at 956.
210. See id. at 979.
211. See id. at 960-61.
212. Id. at 964.
213. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2326 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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attainment of some degree of consensus" about abortion?214
One man's answer to these questions, it seems, may make all
the difference.
214. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 114, 129 (2007) ("The State's interest in
respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and
legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole
of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.");
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000).
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